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Abstract
Through the lens provided by judicial, statutory, and social records from the first half of
the 19th century, with a focus on Harmony v. United States, 1 an avid recreation of
mercantile practices can be formed which emphasizes the role of piracy and privateering
in the early United States of America.
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“It is convenient to be able to denote piracy by the absence of a lawful commission . . .” 2
By this statement, privateering and piracy are as the two sides of the same coin, with the
presence of a state power being the only separation. If “piracy is depredation without any
authority from any prince or state,” 3 privateering is no more than the same depredation under the
authority of a government. Through the lens provided by judicial, statutory, and social records
from the first half of the 19th century, with a focus on Harmony v. United States, 4 an avid
recreation of mercantile practices can be formed which emphasizes the role of piracy and
privateering in the early United States of America.

I. Harmony v. United States (Part 1) : The Piratical Actions of the Malek Adhel

The brig Malek Adhel committed piracy. The reports submitted to the court contained
five separate counts of piracy “each asserting a piratical aggression and restraint on the high seas
upon a different vessel: one, the Madras, belonging to British subjects; another, the Sullivan,
belonging to American citizens; another, the Emily Wilder, belonging to American citizens;
another, the Albert, belonging to British subjects; and another upon a vessel whose name was
unknown, belonging to Portuguese subjects; and this last count contained also an allegation of a
piratical depredation.” 5 John Myers, the first mate to the Malek Adhel offered a firsthand
account of Captain Nunez’s piratical actions:
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Upon the Madras, Captain Nunez ran down the vessel “and fired a blank cartridge.” 6 He
then went on board with crew and “returned in about half an hour with a chronometer.” 7 After
returning the chronometer, the Malek Adhel “fired another blank cartridge.” 8
The Sullivan, having paid no notice to the first shot fired with blank cartridge, found
itself being fired upon with a loaded cannon. Captain Nunez then demanded lamp oil, regardless
of the fact that the Malek Adhel had oil “sufficient to last . . . twelve months.” 9
Captain Nunez and the Malek Adhel next fired a blank cartridge followed by loaded shot
at the Emily Wilder. Captain Nunez ordered her to “send her boat along side [the Malek Adhel]
with their chronometer.” 10 After rating their own chronometer against that of the Emily Wilder,
Captain Nunez sent the vessel on its way.
Running across the unnamed ship in the night, Captain Nunez ordered the vessel to send
over their boat with the captain and its papers. When the unknown captain refused “as their boat
leaked and the night was dark,” Nunez fired a double shot “towards the strange vessel.” 11 He
then sent a contingent of armed men from the Malek Adhel to gather the ships papers. Captain
Nunez gave his men the order to “tell [the] strange captain he must pay twenty dollars for the
shot Nunez had fired at him, and ten dollars for a keg of oil which had been knocked over by the
recoil of the gun . . .[and] to look and see if there were any guns and powder on board the other
vessel, and if there were any, to spike the guns and bring the powder on board, and see if any
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sweetmeats were on board, and bring them on board also.” 12 The Malek Adhel left with “a jar of
sweetmeats, one dog, and twenty dollars for the shot.” 13
The final encounter with the Albert began as the two ships ran afoul with each other.
Nunez ordered five shots fired at the Albert. Captain Nunez then sought to bring the captain of
the Albert aboard and whip him. His men would not do it. Nonetheless the Malek Adhel sent a
group of men over to rate the chronometer before leaving.
These proceeding descriptions of piracy do not appear akin to those traditional ideas of
violence, thieving and plunder that popularly describe piracy in the early 19th century. Contrary
to these modern Hollywood ideals, but still adjudicated as piratical, the brig Malek Adhel
committed crimes on the high seas against the Law of Nations. In context of this paper, the story
of the Malek Adhel offers the distinct difference between piracy and privateering: the letter of
marque and reprisal. Here, the courts condemned a merchant brig for its piratical actions, seizing
the vessel and arresting the crew for what could colloquially be called “be annoying on the high
seas.” In contrast to the petty actions of Captain Nunez, privateers seized merchant vessels
through the use of force and firepower. Nonetheless their lawful commissions insolated these
privateers from the same fate that befell the Malek Adhel.

II. Privateering in the Early 19th Century: Purposes and Statutory Basis

“The question remains whether it is morally right or politically expedient for
governments to grant [letters of marque] or for individuals to act under them.” 14 Disregarding,
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however, the moral and political dilemmas of a civilian fleet harassing the enemy’s economic
maritime infrastructure, privateering played a dominant role in early American maritime
practices. Privateering supplemented the United States’ inadequately powerful naval presence;
it “was a necessary response to the weak state of the U.S. Navy in 1812.” 15 This act of granting
temporary commissions to merchant vessels in order to harass the enemy’s naval and economic
presence has been cited as a cost effective manner to supplement a nation with “but few national
vessels.” 16 The United States, prior to and throughout the war of 1812, defined this idea of “a
nation with but few national vessels.” As a country that had yet to develop a competitive naval
presence, privateering “persisted in American History as an economical way to augment naval
forces against an enemy in wartime,” 17 and as a means of acquiring larger vessels of war.” 18
The usefulness of privateering extended beyond the expansion of military and into the
realms of social and economic importance as well. Friedrich Jacobson sited privateering as both
an economic stimulus and a means of linking the lay person to the war. 19 Under this analysis,
Jacobson examined the importance of restraining the private trade of an enemy, assisting both
the government and the ordinary citizen with the economic burdens of war and of “making the
war to some extent a war of the people.” 20 To put the matter colloquially, the non-military
benefits of privateering created a robin hood effect in which the raiding of enemy merchants in
early America enriched both the government and the citizens of the United States.
14
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Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution grants Congress the power to issue
letters of Marque and Reprisal” 21 in order to create a privateer fleet. The Articles of
Confederation allowed for “letters of marque or reprisal . . . after a declaration of war by the
United States in Congress assembled.” 22 Although no universal law governed the actions of the
multinational privateer fleets, each nation enacted their own rules in accordance with their own
governing bodies. Justice Story identified that “it has been the great object of every maritime
nation to restrain and regulate the conduct of its privateers.” 23 Story recognized that without
governance, these privateer fleets may violate public faith through the disregard of traditional
conventions. He expressed fear that “cartels and flags of truce might be disregarded, and endless
embarrassments [may] arise in negotiations, with foreign powers.” 24 As such the United States
created a series of laws meant to further govern the actions of its privateers.
By the Prize Act of 1812, “the President of the United States is authorized to establish
and order suitable instructions for the better governing and directing the conduct of vessels
commissioned” as privateers. 25 The Supreme Court further defined the Prize Act as allowing the
President to “grant, annul and revoke, at his pleasure, the commissions of privateers.” 26 The
Court reasoned that “the right of capture is entirely derived from the law: it is not an absolute,
vested right which cannot be taken away or modified, [instead] it is a limited right.” 27
These strict regulations concerning the practices of privateering stem from the startling
similarities between piracy and privateering. By means of example, contemporary British law
21
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declared any privateer who ransomed a captured, neutral ship “instead of bringing them into port
to try the justice of detention . . . are guilty of piracy.” 28 British law continued to explain that
although a letter of marque grants immunity to raid neutral vessels, “if the commission be
wantonly exceeded . . . our statute law punishes with death, and considers [such actions] as
piracies.” 29 Although privateering existed in the early 19th century as a state sanctioned and
legislatively controlled means of establishing a naval presence, these regulations depict its
likeness to piracy and take preventative action against any privateer willing to cross the line into
lawlessness.

III. Piracy in the Early 19th Century

A. Statutory Governance Controlling Piracy

Regardless of the laws that define privateering, the definitive truth is that without a
lawful commission, privateering is piracy. “A pirate is he who sailing without being authorized
by any sovereign to make captures, commits depredations at sea or on shore.” 30 Congress
enacted the following laws in pursuance of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution which enables
them “to define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and offences
against the Law of Nations.” 31 This Law of Nations has been categorized efficiently by Sir
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William Blackstone in his Commentaries, 32 and extended to include such principles as requiring
a declaration of war or a letter of marque in order to attack foreign trading, and most importantly
here, requiring the prosecution of piracy.
As the Malek Adhel entered the limelight in the 1840’s, Congress had permanently
defined an act of piracy.
“By the temporary acts of Congress of 3d March, 1819, and 15h May, 1820, made perpetual by that of 30th
January, 1823, robbery upon the high seas, or in any open roadstead, or in any basin or bay, or in any river
where the sea ebbs and flows, upon any ship or vessel, or upon any of the ship’s company of any ship or
vessel, is piracy, and punished with death.” 33

This 1820’s definition of piracy reflects the earlier legal principal from 1790 in which
“In general, the commission at sea, or in a river, haven, bason or bay, out of the jurisdiction of any
particular state, of murder, robbery, or any other offence, which if omitted within the body of a country,
would, by the law of the United States, be punishable with death.” 34

Even in today’s world, piracy carries a heavy punishment. In 2013, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals cited to Harmony in United States v. Shibin, and determined that “piracy is subject to
universal jurisdiction, as pirates are considered hostis humani generis, the enemies of all
humankind.” 35 The Circuit Court based their determinations on 18 USCS 1651 which states that
“whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is
afterwards brought into or found in the United states, shall be imprisoned for life.” 36 The Shibin
Court offered the modern day definition of piracy as defined by Article 101 of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea:
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
32
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(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends
by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on
board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any
State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of
facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b). 37

While the definitions of piracy offered thus far have revolved around themes of murder
and robbery, the 19th century legislature expanded the definition of piracy into the field of
harassment as well. Section IV of the act of 1819 clarified the idea of “piratical aggressions”
which extended to include search, restraint, depredation or seizure. 38 This act continued by
establishing a punishment for a piratical aggression which is less than the death sentence
imposed upon committing piracy. A piratical aggression resulted in the “sale and distribution”
of the offending vessel. 39

B. The Role of Agency in Punishment for Piracy

Herein lays the core debate in the case of Harmony v. United States and any other case of
piracy in which an innocent owner suffered a high agency cost due to the losses incurred by their
agent, the captain: to what extent does the condemnation of a ship for piratical aggression
condemn the presumably innocent owners of the cargo and the vessel? This topic must be
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discussed in two pieces: the liability of the owner through the 19th century laws of agency, and
the extent to which the sale and distribution extended over the offending vessel.
When the United States Navy took the Malek Adhel in 1840, the punishment for piracy
was death. The punishment for piratical aggressions required the sale and distribution of the
offending vessel. 40 The courts calculated the fines owed to the government and to the injured
party, and drew these pecuniary damages from the captured pirate ship. “For petty misconduct,
or petty plunderage . . . [the Court] contends itself with the mitigated rule of compensation in
damages” rather than punishment by death. 41 While a bright line rule concerning the
punishment for piracy provided clarification regarding pecuniary damages, uncertainty existed in
context of respondent superior and third party ownership of a condemned ship.

Judge Story

addressed these issues of agency by analyzing “whether the innocence of the owners can
withdraw the ship from penalty of confiscation under the act of Congress.” 42
In his earlier commentaries on the law of agency in regard to maritime commerce and
jurisprudence, 43 Judge Story explained that “the owner of a ship will be liable for damages and
losses arising . . . by reason of the negligence, the fraud, the unskillfulness, or the tortious acts of
the master.” 44 Justice Story made clear in regard to piracy that although an owner “is not liable
for the torts . . . of his agent in any matters beyond the agency . . . [and therefore] never liable for
the unauthorized, willful, or malicious act or trespass of his agent,” 45 that the act of 1819 “makes
no exception whatsoever, whether the [piratical] aggression be with or without the cooperation of
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the owners.” 46 Story expanded on this idea of the owner’s liability through his explanation that
“[it] is not an uncommon course in the admiralty . . . to treat the vessel [by] which . . . a wrong
or offence has been done as the offender, without any regard whatsoever to the personal
misconduct or responsibility of the owner thereof.” 47 Story concluded this idea of agency in
regards to piracy by summarizing that “the acts of the master and crew, in cases of [piracy or
piratical aggression], bind the interest of the owner of the ship, whether he be innocent or guilty;
and he impliedly submits to whatever the law denounces as a forfeiture attached to the ship by
reason of their unlawful or wanton wrongs.” 48
Having established the rule that an owner’s vessel is liable for an agent’s piratical action,
the next rule the court had to determine was the extent of this owner liability. The Harmony
Court determined that the Rule of 1819 extended only to captured ship and not to any attached
cargo. 49 The Rule of 1819 contained only the following provisions in regard to compensation for
piratical aggression:
“After due process and trial, or in any court having admiralty jurisdiction, and which shall be holden for the
district into which such captured vessel shall be brought; and the same court shall thereupon order a sale
and distribution thereof accordingly, and that their discretion.” 50

Justice Story expanded on this legislation through the clarification that “under the act of
1819, it is plain that the cargo stands upon a very different ground from that of the ship.” 51 Story
made clear that a cargo owned by a third party, separated entirely from the ship, would retain its
ownership property. 52 Similarly he concluded that even when the owner of a cargo shared an
ownership of the condemned vessel, “the cargo is not generally deemed to be involved in the
46
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same confiscation as the ship, unless the owner thereof co-operates in or authorizes the unlawful
act.” 53

IV. Harmony v. United States (Part 2) : The Facts and Holdings

Returning now to the details of the Malek Adhel provides concrete example of the
aforementioned laws and practices regarding piracy and privateering in the early 19th century.
While the Malek Adhel did commit piracy, the focal point of this case rests on the relationship of
the owners to the captain.

A. Facts of the Case

The brig Malek Adhel committed piracy. The above pages clarify the exact extent to
which this piracy extended. The Supreme Court, however, did not try Harmony v. United States
in order contemplate the actions of Captain Nunez and the vessel, but rather to consider the
implications between owner and master. As such, the crimes of piracy will remain documented
above, but will not reappear in this second section. Instead, Harmony v. United States will be
analyzed, interpreted, and explained through a lens of agency and historical context.
Peter Harmony, Leonardo Swarez, and Bernard Graham jointly owned “the brig, her
tackle, apparel, furniture, and cargo.” 54 These three men existed both as the exclusive owners of
the Malek Adhel and the owners throughout the entirety of the aforementioned affair. 55 By all
known information, these owners equipped the brig with the “usual equiptments of a vessel of
53
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her class, on an innocent commercial voyage,” and neither contemplated nor authorized any acts
inconsistent with the merchant trade. 56 In fact, the owners of the vessel never contemplated
anything beyond “an innocent commercial voyage from New York to Guayamas,” under the
command of Captain Joseph Nunez. 57
The innocent voyage that the owners had originally intended went quickly awry and the
execution of the journey strayed far from the original plan. Peter Harmony and his fellow
owners routed the voyage to begin in New York and to end in Guayamas Mexico. Instead,
Captain Joseph Nunez began his voyage in New York, traveled through Fayal and concluded his
trip in Bahia, Brazil. 58 For modern reference, Salvador is the modern day Bahia. While at first
glance, Captain Nunez took the Malek Adhel dramatically out of its way, possibly
foreshadowing the blatant disregard of orders, a further analysis demonstrates that until this point
that captain may have still been adhering to the profitable goals of the ship’s owners. “Colonial
agents sometimes used their initiative in selecting a different rouge for a vessel then the one
intended by the owner.” 59 These divergences in plan stemmed from changing opportunities and
inadequate communications. By means of example the Brislington in 1756 arrived at a port
contrary to the intention of the ship’s owners. The master of the ship acted under the knowledge
that a great deal of rice had already been sent from Charleston to [the intended port] that year,”
and the master saw fit to dispose of the cargo at a more profitable location. 60 Returning now to
the situation of the Malek Adhel, Captain Nunez and his brig may not have acted inappropriately.
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When considering that such divergences in plan were common place, the unaccounted for
deviance in route appears harmless.
While a divergence in route may be harmless to shipping in the 19th century, the
aforementioned piracy created catastrophic results for the owners of the ship and cargo. Upon
reaching the port of Bahia, the sailors on the Malek Adhel “told [the first mate] they would do no
more work until they saw the American consul.” 61 Following this demand, the first mate met
with the American consul in Brazil and presented a full account of the piratical aggressions
committed by Captain Nunez; the Captain confirmed the truth of these statements. 62 Following
a presentation of these facts to the office of the consul in Bahia, the U.S. navy transferred
members of the crew to Rio to presumably meet with George William Gordon, the United States
Consul serving in Rio de Janeira from 1840 until 1846. 63 The last records of the crew indicated
that they left Rio in custody aboard the Malek Adhel under the command of United States Navy
Lieutenant Drayton. 64 First Mate, John Myers recorded that Captain Nunez was last seen in jail
at Rio. 65

B. Holding by Justice Story

The United States navy eventually brought the Malek Adhel into the prize courts of
Baltimore for adjudication. 66 Here, the defense raised the following contentions: the brig was not
an armed vessel as defined by the act of 1819; “the aggressions, restraints, and depredations
61
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disclosed in the evidence were not piratical” under the act of 1819; and that “because the owners
neither participated in nor authorized the piratical acts . . . if the brig is so liable to
condemnation, the cargo is not, either under the act of Congress or by the law of nations.” 67 Z.
Collins Lee and R. Johnson presented to the court an argument which suitably persuaded Justice
Story to decide for the United States in all but the final count. Jonathan Meredith Jr. 68 and John
Nelson, 69 counsel for Peter Harmony and the owners of the brig, preserved the cargo of the ship
for their clients in the final count.
Justice Story determined in the first count that the brig Malek Adhel “is an armed vessel
within the true intent and meaning of the act” of 1819. 70 Clarifying the act, Story explained that
“no distinction is taken, or even suggested . . . as to the objects, or purposes, or character of the
armament” aboard the vessel. 71 The presence of “a cannon and some ammunition . . . pistols and
daggers,” transformed the brig into an armed vessel. 72 Whether the Malek Adhel had run its
original trade route or not, the brig was armed.
Under the second question, counsel for Harmony contended that the actions of the Malek
Adhel were not piratical under the act of 1819. As the abovementioned section IV of the act
specifically sets forth, “piratical aggressions” are punishable and extend to include search,
restraint, depredation or seizure. 73 Justice Story used this opportunity to further clarify the act
of 1819 and made clear that “where the act uses the word "piratical," it does so in a general
sense; importing that the aggression is unauthorized by the law of nations, hostile in its character,
67
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wanton and criminal in its commission, and utterly without any sanction from any public
authority or sovereign power.” 74 Counsel for Harmony had argued that any piratical aggression
must be committed “with a view to plunder and not for any other purpose” 75 The Court
immediately rejected such a proposition under the theory that such a “narrow and limited”
interpretation allowed acts of “hostile or atrocious or indispensable nature” on the high seas so
long as the purpose is not plunder. 76 Applying the facts of the case to this redefined term of
piracy revealed to the Court that “the search or restraint [by the Malek Adhel] may be piratical
although no plunder follows, or is found worth carrying away.” 77 Regardless of whether the
intention of this piratical depredation was “to train his crew to acts of wanton and piratical
mischief . . . to seduce them into piratical enterprises [or simply] a reckless and wanton abuse of
power, to gratify his own lawless passions,” Captain Nunez and the brig Malek Adhel committed
piracy under the act of 1819. 78
The final issue that the Supreme Court determined brings us back to Story’s
interpretation of agency in regard to piracy: did the innocence of the Peter Harmony provide any
defense in the confiscation of his ship and cargo? The Malek Adhel provided a canvas for the
Supreme Court to address this questions of third party ownership and many of the rules
established above were determined through the catalyst provided by this case. While Captain
Nunez had physical control of the Malek Adhel, Peter Harmony, Leonardo Swarez and Bernard
Graham owned the “brig, her tackle, apparel, furniture and cargo.” 79 These owners challenged
the seizure of their property. They condemned the illegal actions of the captain and sought
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return of their cargo, arguing that they were being punished by the unapproved and illegal
actions of their captain. 80 Justice Story immediately clarified that Congress made “no exception
whatsoever, whether the aggression be with or without the co-operation of the owners.” 81 “The
vessel which commits the aggression is treated as the offender.” 82 The Court cited to the
common course of admiralty “under the law of nations,” in order to make their determination in
this matter. 83
However established the doctrine of vessel liability may be, the question regarding the
cargo remained unanswered at this time. The act of 1819 made no reference to the cargo, and the
law of nations offered no direct precedent to consider on this matter. To answer this question,
Justice Story considered the intention of the law, citing that “the general rule is, not forfeiture of
the offending property; but compensation to the full extent of all damages sustained or
reasonable allowable.” 84 The Court further considered that the Law of Nations may require
confiscation of cargo but only for “very gross and wanton violations of duty,” and even then
only in cases of “extraordinary turpitude or violence.” 85 The Supreme Court in The Marianna
Flora determined that although for “gross violations of the law of nations on the high seas, the
penalty of confiscation may be properly inflicted upon the [cargo] . . . it is not therefore to be
admitted, that every offence . . . is to be visited with such harsh punishments.” 86 Applying the
facts relevant to Peter Harmony and the Malek Adhel revealed to the Court that “the present case
seems . . . fairly to fall within the general principle of exempting the cargo.” 87 The Court
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determined that because the “owners are confessedly innocent, [and] free from any imputation of
guilty and every suspicion,” they “should be unwilling to enforce” the confiscation of cargo. 88

C. Conclusion

Peter Harmony, Leonardo Swarez and Bernard Graham recovered only their cargo as the
saga of the Malek Adhel reached its conclusion. Captain Nunez sailed in a time of privateers and
piracy and found himself acting as the latter. His lack of a commission along with his belligerent
actions landed the Captain in the brig and the owners of the Malek Adhel without a ship. The
above focus on Harmony v. United States along with the records and results of the court
demonstrated the role of piracy and privateering in the early United States of America.

Appendix I – Character Biographies

In the spirit of providing an avid recreation of the setting surrounding the mercantile
practices of the Malek Adhel, two specific characters generalize the case and add context to the
time and place: Z. Collins Lee and Captain Percival Dratyon. Z. Collins Lee entered the scene as
the attorney for the United States alongside R. Johnson. Zaccheus Collins Lee, born 1805 and
dying 1859, was the nephew of Light-Horse Harry Lee and the First Cousin of Robert E. Lee. 89
Records indicate that Lee “was a classmate of Edgar Allan Poe [at the University of Virginia],
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and one of the few attendees of Poe’s funeral.” 90 Z. Collins Lee served as the United States
Attorney for the District of Maryland from 1841-1845 and again from 1850-1853. 91
Captain Percival Drayton served to escort the imprisoned sailors from Bahia, to Rio, and
then back to the United States while serving as a Navy Lieutenant. Captain Drayton, born in
Charleston South Carolina, continued to have a superior career as a naval officer with recorded
victories against the confederacy in Port Royal, South Carolina. Drayton’s commands included
the gunboat Pocahontas, the sloop of war Pawnee, the ironclad Passaic, superintendent of
ordinance at New York Navy Yard, fleet captain to the commander of the West Gulf Blockading
Squadron, and Chief of the Bureau of Navigation. Captain Drayton died in 1865 and has had two
Navy destroyers named in his honor. 92
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